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Abstract
The Asia Pacific region includes six of the
world’s nine nuclear-armed states, and in all of
them relevant policymakers, still caught in a
Cold War mindset, continue to believe in
nuclear deterrence as a force for peace and
stability, perceiving nuclear disarmament to be
not only unachievable, but undesirable. But—
whether the context is major powers seeking to
neutralise threats from each other (United
States, Russia, China and India), non-nuclear
allies seeking nuclear protection from various
threat contingencies (Japan, South Korea and
Australia) or vulnerable states seeking a ‘stra-
tegic equaliser’ (Pakistan and North Korea)—
the traditional strategic arguments for nuclear
deterrence are much weaker than they may first
seem. Whatever may have been the case for the
Cold War years, in today’s world the risks asso-
ciated with the acquisition or retention of
nuclear weapons far outweigh any conceivable
utility they may have. The financial arguments
against them—that they are indefensibly
costly—are strong. And the humanitarian argu-
ments are overwhelming: nuclear weapons
remain the most indiscriminately inhumane
ever devised, and they should be outlawed as
chemical and biological weapons have been.
Making disarmament happen will never be
easy, but—with the right political leader-
ship—is not impossible. Focusing, realistically,
in the first instance on minimization rather than
elimination, practical steps can be taken to
dramatically reduce nuclear weapon numbers,
deployment and alert status, and doctrinal reli-
ance on them. Doing so would dramatically
reduce, both regionally and globally, the now
ever-present risk of nuclear catastrophe.
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1. The Issues
Old habits die hard, and habits of thought about
nuclear deterrence die harder than most. Ideas
formed in the Cold War years have proved just
as tenacious in Asia and the Pacific as in their
Euro-Atlantic birthplace, despite all the funda-
mental changes since then in the geopolitical
environment. ‘Asia and the Pacific’, however
defined, includes six of the world’s nine
nuclear-armed states—the United States,
Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North
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Korea1—excluding only the United Kingdom,
France and Israel. Among relevant policy-
makers in all of them the belief remains strong
that nuclear deterrence works as a force for
peace and stability, and that for that reason
nuclear disarmament may be not only impos-
sible but undesirable. Nuclear weapons may be
the most indiscriminately inhumane ever
devised, and the humanitarian case may be
overwhelming for them being outlawed, as
chemical and biological weapons have been.
But unless and until policy-makers stop seeing
nuclear weapons as useful, there will be no
serious prospect, regionally or globally, of their
elimination.
All the issues with which policy-makers and
analysts have long wrestled in the context of
the struggle between the United States and
Soviet Union—about the utility of nuclear
weapons in preserving peace between the
major powers, and inhibiting attacks on lesser
ones—have echoes throughout this region.
And all the reasons which—for better or
worse—have led nuclear-armed states to
acquire and retain their weapons, and resist
any serious move to eliminate them, resonate
here at least as much as they do in Atlantic and
Middle Eastern contexts.
Belief in the deterrent role of nuclear
weapons may not be the only reason why states
acquire and retain nuclear weapons, and are
reluctant to pay more than lip-service to the
objective of eliminating them. For some states,
considerations of status and prestige have been
and remain very important. India is most often
seen as the state for which this factor was
crucial in its initial decision to acquire nuclear
weapons—weighing at least equally with its
concern to neutralise a possible nuclear threat
from China. Russia—along with France and
the United Kingdom—are most often seen as
the states for which the psychological pain of
ultimately giving up their nuclear weapons
would now be most acute.
It may also be that a key strategic motive,
beyond deterrence, for acquiring or retaining
nuclear weapons is compellence, with a state
believing that nuclear weapons offer it advan-
tages in persuading adversaries to make con-
cessions or change their behaviour. There is
a quite widespread perception that nuclear
weapons can dramatically increase a state’s
coercive bargaining power, not least in warn-
ings from Washington policy-makers over the
years that adversaries like North Korea—and
Iran and Iraq—would be able to ‘blackmail’ the
United States and its allies if they obtained
nuclear weapons. Speculative commentary
abounds in the literature about leaders being
more likely to capitulate in a diplomatic con-
frontation if faced with a nuclear-armed adver-
sary, even if the nuclear threat is only implicit.
But there is in fact little or no evidence to back
up any such conjecture. And most practitioners
would be unpersuaded that that any nuclear-
armed state in this region, or anywhere else,
would be willing to break the international nor-
mative taboo—discussed further below—agai-
nst the aggressive use, or threat of use, of such
weapons which unquestionably now exists.2
So, for practical policy purposes, it is the
perceived deterrent utility of nuclear weapons,
rather than other possible motives, which
remains at the heart of the explanation as to
why states have and retain nuclear weapons,
and it is this issue above all others which has to
be addressed if the case for their elimination is
ever to gain traction.
When it comes to new thinking about nuclear
deterrence, the current strategic environment in
Asia and the Pacific is both a challenge and an
1. The description of North Korea here as ‘nuclear-
armed’ simply acknowledges that it now possesses a stock-
pile, albeit very small, of nuclear explosive devices, and
some missile delivery capability. It does not imply that
other states do, or should, treat it in the same way as they
do the five recognised nuclear-weapons states under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (United States,
Russia, China, France and United Kingdom) or the three
other established nuclear-armed states (India, Pakistan and
Israel) who, unlike North Korea, were never party to the
NPT.
2. See Sechser T S, Fuhrmann M (2013) Crisis Bargain-
ing and Nuclear Blackmail. International Organization
67, 173–95. This comprehensive quantitative analysis of
over two hundred interstate crisis situations, involving
both nuclear and non-nuclear states and military threats
both express and implied, found no statistically significant
basis for concluding that nuclear weapon possession
(or superiority) was associated with more effective
compellent threats.
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opportunity. The scale of the challenge is
obvious. The extraordinarily rapid economic
and military rise of China, the United States’
apparent unwillingness to yield any of its estab-
lished authority in the region in response,
Russia’s newly reassertive nationalism, the
repeated provocations by North Korea and the
reactions they have generated in South Korea
and Japan, and the continuing inability of India
and Pakistan to achieve any kind of comprehen-
sive rapprochement have all created strategic
uncertainty. Multiple and unresolved territorial
disputes exist, most immediately dangerously
in the South China Sea and East China Sea, but
also over Taiwan and on the China–India bor-
der. Military capabilities are growing, includ-
ing nuclear weapons stockpiles in the case of
Pakistan, India and China, and new conven-
tional power projection and missile defence
capabilities in the case of the United States.
Overall, tensions are growing, not decreasing.
The opportunity for new thinking may be
less obvious than these challenges, but in a
sense it flows from them. Complacent assump-
tions about continuation of the early post-Cold
War dynamics, with the United States enjoying
comfortable primacy and nuclear confronta-
tion seen as yesterday’s problem, no longer
apply. It is exactly the right time for the
nuclear armed states to be asking themselves
whether their weapons stockpiles—and the
doctrines and deployment postures that go
with them—are diminishing or adding to these
tensions, and whether the risks of reliance
upon them outweigh any possible returns. In
President Barack Obama the United States has
a leader committed both intellectually and
emotionally to a nuclear weapons free world,
as movingly demonstrated in his April 2009
Prague speech, and repeated in Berlin in
2013.3 And the emergence of new political
leadership in a number of key countries—most
importantly China—may make it easier for
new approaches to gain momentum.
The following sections first describe the
nature and extent of the current reliance on
nuclear deterrence by key states in the region;
second, revisit the case for nuclear disarma-
ment, focusing particularly on whether the
traditional arguments for nuclear deterrence
still deserve to carry the policy weight they
do; and third, suggest what might now most
usefully be done by the relevant state actors
to translate into effective policy action the
compelling humanitarian, financial and strate-
gic arguments that can be made against
nuclear deterrence and in favour of nuclear
disarmament.4
2. Current Reliance on
Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear deterrence is not a one-size-fits-all
concept. The nuclear capabilities, intentions
and attitudes of the key state actors vary con-
siderably, and need to be described individu-
ally. The most that can be said in general terms
is that there are three different contexts within
which each makes its decisions. For the major
powers in the region, the utility of nuclear
deterrence is seen primarily to lie in
neutralising potential threats from others of
that stature (as with the United States and
Russia, United States and China, Russia and
China, and China and India). For lesser powers
allied to a major one, it is seen to lie in their
acquiring nuclear protection against a variety
3. Remarks by President Obama: Hradcany Square,
Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009 at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-
Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered, and Branden-
burg Gate Berlin, June 19, 2013, at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-
president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany
4. This article draws on, while not purporting to compre-
hensively review, the relevant scholarly literature, which
is vast in scope and depth both on nuclear policy generally
and the geopolitics of the region. It also draws substan-
tially on the author’s experience as a policy practitio-
ner—as a long-serving foreign minister, head of an
international non-governmental organisation focused on
conflict prevention, and initiator, member or co-chair of a
series of major international commissions and panels
addressing nuclear issues. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges research input and advice from colleagues associ-
ated with the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament at the ANU Crawford School of Public
Policy (CNND), and fellow members—all with high-level
political, military or diplomatic experience—of the Asia
Pacific Leadership Network on Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament (APLN).
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of threat contingencies without having to
acquire nuclear weapons themselves (as with
the ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ offered by
the United States to Japan and South Korea,
and less explicitly to Australia and others). For
lesser powers without such formal protection,
or lacking confidence as to how far the support
of a traditional friend will reach, their acquisi-
tion of a nuclear deterrent is seen as providing
a strategic equaliser against much stronger
potential adversaries (as with Pakistan against
India), or at least as raising the pain threshold
high enough to force would-be regime chang-
ers, territory-acquirers or punishers to think
again (as with North Korea).
2.1 United States
The United States had at the end of 2012 some
1,700 strategic and 200 tactical nuclear war-
heads operationally deployed, and another
2,750 of both in reserve, with delivery systems
extending across the whole land-sea-air triad.5
The stated purpose of this arsenal is ‘in
extreme circumstances to defend the vital
interests of the United States or its allies and
partners’.6 It is buttressed by huge conven-
tional military capability—with US military
expenditure continuing to account for 40 per
cent or more of the world total7—which is now
being further reinforced by the development of
ballistic missile defence (BMD)8 and new gen-
eration conventional strike capability, espe-
cially the long-range Conventional Prompt
Global Strike program.9 Despite these
resources being more than adequate to deal
with any conceivable threat contingency to
itself or its allies for the foreseeable future, the
United States has not embraced a ‘No First
Use’ nuclear posture10; nor has it been pre-
pared to adopt, as a fall-back, a ‘sole purpose’
declaration—viz. ‘a universal policy that
deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of
nuclear weapons’—although it has pledged ‘to
work to establish conditions under which such
a policy could be safely adopted’.11 That said,
the United States has significantly reduced its
nuclear arsenal since the height of the Cold
War, is not building any new generation
nuclear weapons, has been a willing partici-
pant in nuclear arms reduction negotiations,
and has under President Obama embraced the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons as an
ultimate objective.
2.2 Russia
Russia has a comparably sized nuclear
arsenal—with some 1,800 strategic warheads
deployed and another 700 in reserve, and
1,000 tactical warheads in reserve, again
across the whole delivery triad—but places
more comparative reliance on nuclear weapons
than does the United States in its defence and
security policy. The erosion over time of its
once-great conventional capability, distrust of
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
enlargement, and the drumbeating nationalist
political style of President Putin, have all been
important contributing factors to this posi-
tion.12 Russia is engaged in significant mod-
ernisation of both its nuclear and conventional
5. For these and all other weapons figures cited see
Thakur R, Evans G (eds) (2013) Nuclear Weapons: The
State of Play, pp 18–19. Crawford School Centre for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Australian
National University, Canberra. This incorporates latest
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
data as at December 2012.
6. United States Department of Defense (2010) Nuclear
Posture Review Report, p 16.
7. SIPRI (2012) SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Dis-
armament and International Security, p 152. Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
8. Rinehart I, Hildreth S, Lawrence S (2013) Ballistic
Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation
and Opposition. Congressional Research Service, Wash-
ington DC, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf.
9. Woolf A (2013) Conventional Prompt Global Strike
and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and
Issues. Congressional Research Service, Washington DC,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf.
10. Perkovich G (2013) Do Unto Others: Toward a
Defensible Nuclear Doctrine. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington DC, http://carne
gieendowment.org/2013/04/01/do-unto-others-toward-
defensible-nuclear-doctrine/fvbs#
11. United States Department of Defense (2010) Nuclear
Posture Review Report, p. viii.
12. Browne D, Ischinger W, Ivanov I, Nunn S (2013)
Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region,
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capability, and will not commit to ‘No First
Use’: its stated posture is that ‘Russia reserves
the right to use nuclear weapons in response to
the use of nuclear and other types of weapons
of mass destruction against it or its allies, and
also in case of aggression against Russia with
the use of conventional weapons when the very
existence of the state is threatened’.13 Since the
2010 New START treaty agreement to reduce
both sides’ deployed strategic weapons, it has
been unwilling to engage in further nuclear
arms reductions negotiations with the United
States—on the basis that Washington’s BMD
and long range conventional weapons pro-
grams have more to do with undercutting stra-
tegic stability and Russia’s security than
countering rogue states and terrorists, and that
Russia needs all its tactical nuclear weapons to
offset NATO’s (and, though this is not stated
explicitly, China’s) superiority in conventional
forces, and to deter other nuclear armed states
within range of Russian territory.14 And
de-alerting of the nearly 2,000 Russian and US
deployed warheads still set at dangerously
high launch-on-warning status remains hos-
tage to stated Russian fears that its second
strike retaliatory capability (heavily deployed
in static locations) is vulnerable to US
counterforce superiority.
2.3 China
China’s nuclear arsenal is much smaller. While
some Russian and other sources argue for
much higher numbers, the consensus of
Western governments and scholars is that it
had at the end of 2012 no more than around
200 deployed nuclear warheads, with another
40 in reserve. While a substantial program of
modernisation is under way, and some increase
in these numbers can be expected, China
seems committed to a minimum deterrence
posture, and to continuing its long-standing
policy that it ‘will not be the first to use nuclear
weapons at any time and under any circum-
stance, and unequivocally commits that under
no circumstances will it use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon
states or nuclear weapon free zones’.15 Its war-
heads are primarily land based, increasingly
mobile both by road and inside an extensive
system of underground tunnels to enhance
their survivability, and intended to be increas-
ingly submarine based for the same reason.16
China, like Russia, expresses concern that its
second-strike capability is vulnerable to US
conventional superiority, particularly with the
further development of BMD and long-range
weapons (and with these concerns multiplied
by Washington’s ‘pivot’ to Asia announced in
2011) and says it cannot be expected to engage
in arms reduction talks while these uncertain-
ties continue. Beijing remains resolutely non-
transparent about the size and deployment of
its arsenal, saying only that it is premised on
three needs: to be survivable, to have penetra-
bility and to deter—with deterrence in China’s
case best ensured, unlike for the two major
nuclear powers, by uncertainty rather than cer-
tainty as to the extent of its capability.17
p 11. Nuclear Threat Initiative, https://www.nti.org/media/
pdfs/BMS_Long_Report_FINAL.pdf
13. Military Doctrine 2010, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/
documents/33.html (in Russian). Presumably Russia’s
‘allies’ for this purpose are the Collective Security Treaty
Organization members (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakstan,
Kyrgyztan and Tajikistan), but the concept of an extended
nuclear deterrence umbrella does not seem to have the
same salience here as it does for the US’s Asian and
European allies See further Trenin D (2005) Russia’s
Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century Environment, p.15,
IFRI Proliferation Papers, http://www.ifri.org/files/
Securite_defense/prolif_paper_Trenin.pdf
14. Arbatov A (2013) The US-Russia Reset Four Years
On: State and Challenges. European Leadership Network
(ELN), http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/25/us-
russia-reset-four-years-on-state-and-challenges/fx75
15. ‘China’s National Defence in 2010’, Information
Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China, quoted—with other sources—in Centre for Strate-
gic and International Studies (2013) Nuclear Weapons and
U.S.-China Relations: A Way Forward, p.11. Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington.
16. Acton J (2012) The Dragon Dance: US-China Secu-
rity Cooperation. In Mathews JT (ed) Global Ten: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities for the President in 2013,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington
DC; CSIS (2013) Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Rela-
tions: A Way Forward, p. 28. Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington.
17. As articulated by Major-General Yao Funzhun of the
Academy of Military Science, China, in speech to the
2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference,
Washington DC, 8 April 2013 (author’s note).
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2.4 India
While not forthcoming about its numbers,
India is believed to have 80–100 deployed war-
heads, until now land and air based but with a
developing submarine capability. Its arsenal,
like Pakistan’s, has doubled in the last decade
and continues to grow, primarily to maintain
an effective deterrent in relation to China, but
also with an eye to Pakistan, which is strongly
committed to expanding its now comparably
sized stockpile. India’s decision to move to
fully nuclear-armed status in 1998 appears to
have given less attention to the prospect of
Pakistan following suit18 than it did to a com-
bination of concerns about China (with memo-
ries still long of the 1962 border war) and
considerations of national prestige and power
projection—the desire to be recognised as an
international actor of comparable weight to
the permanent members of the UN Security
Council. India has been from the outset, and
remains, highly ambivalent about its nuclear
status: on the one hand, strongly attached to
the idea of a nuclear weapon free world (and to
the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan as a guide
for getting there),19 but on the other hand, stri-
dent in its resistance to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as ‘unequal’ and
unwilling to take any step towards disarma-
ment that might be perceived as increasing its
security vulnerability or reducing its interna-
tional authority. All this is reflected in its rela-
tively modest overall nuclear posture, which is
based on credible minimum deterrence, and
embraces ‘No First Use’ (albeit maintaining
the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons
in the event of a major attack by biological or
chemical weapons’).20
2.5 Pakistan
Pakistan has 90–110 warheads, is expanding its
arsenal as fast as it can, and not only planning,
like India, to send nuclear weapons to sea, but
testing short-range weapons designed for
battlefield use, to counter India’s conven-
tional military advantage. Islamabad is quite
unambivalent about its nuclear capability. It
does not accept ‘No First Use’, sees its nuclear
weapons as not only a political instrument but a
matter of military necessity, has been enraged at
its perceived unequal treatment by the interna-
tional community as compared with India (in
the context of the US-led decision by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow India access
to nuclear technology and material), and has
shown no inclination to match disarmament
rhetoric with action. In particular, it plays an
active role in blocking, at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva, even the commence-
ment of negotiations on a treaty to stop future
production of fissile material for use in nuclear
weapons, arguing that if existing stockpiles are
not also addressed, inhibiting future production
would endanger its security.21
2.6 North Korea
Since confirming its withdrawal from the NPT
in 2003, North Korea has been actively devel-
oping and testing nuclear weapons and missile
delivery systems, and is assessed to have
enough fissile material for 4–12 weapons,
18. While it stretches credulity that Indian policy-makers
could have been ignorant of, or indifferent to, the extent of
Pakistan’s nuclear capability in 1998, this is the strong
view of one prominent Pakistani participant in high-level
discussions at the time: see Hoodbhoy P (2013) Scientists
and an atomic subcontinent. Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists, 12 February 2013, http://thebulletin.org/scientists-
and-atomic-subcontinent; Hoodbhoy P (ed) (2012)
Confronting the Bomb: Pakistani and Indian Scientists
Speak Out, Oxford University Press, Pakistan.
19. Sethi M (2013) Identifying Principles for a Nuclear
Weapons-Free World: The Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan as a
Relevant Guide. Nuclear Abolition Forum 2, 23–8.
20. Prime Minister’s Office Press Release (4 January
2003) Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress
in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine http://
pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/
r040120033.html
21. See generally Dalton T, Tandler J (2012) Understand-
ing the ‘Arms Race’ in South Asia, The Carnegie Papers,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September
2012, Washington DC, http://carnegieendowment.org/
2012/09/13/understanding-arms-race-in-south-asia/dtj0;
Krepon M (2012) Nuclear Race on the Subcontinent.
The New York Times, 4 April 2012 http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/04/05/opinion/global/nuclear-race-on-the-
subcontinent.html?_r=0
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depending on warhead design and yield. It has
also been steadily hardening its formal doctri-
nal commitment to nuclear-armed status, most
recently with the announcement in March 2013
of the ‘Pyongjin Line’, which calls for the
parallel development of nuclear weapons and
economic expansion.22 The Six Party Talks,
convened since 2003 by China (involving the
United States, South Korea, Japan and Russia
along with North Korea) have so far made no
progress in achieving denuclearisation, with
the situation complicated by Pyongyang regu-
larly adopting a posture of extreme belligerence
and threatening the United States and its allies
with war, albeit always in the context of per-
ceived threats to its own regime, or in wounded
response to the application of ever more inter-
national sanctions in response to previous
behaviour in defiance of international sanc-
tions. By and large North Korea’s provocations
have been met with reasonable calm, on the
assumption that even if it developed the neces-
sary capability it would stop short of an inevi-
tably suicidal nuclear attack. But the situation
remains volatile and the prospect not remote of
serious miscalculation generating a major
confrontation.
2.7 South Korea
Belief in nuclear deterrence remains very
strong, and in the context of North Korea’s
serial misbehaviour there has been evident
continuing public support in South Korea for
some form of domestic nuclear weapons
program,23 with at least one major political
figure, former Presidential candidate Chung
Mong-Joon, arguing in favour not only of the
reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons
withdrawn from local soil in 1991 but of South
Korea building its own nuclear arsenal.24 But
there is no support from the new Park Geun-
hye administration for either course, and the
United States will rebuff any such move as
firmly as it stopped South Korea’s initial steps
towards becoming a nuclear power four
decades ago. The price for that South Korean
forbearance, however, is likely to continue to
be US willingness to protect it from all major
threat contingencies, as it is obliged in broad
terms by the 1954 Mutual Security Treaty to
do, and has made clear on many subsequent
occasions that it will. The question remains
whether this extended deterrence commitment
needs itself to have a nuclear component. In
the context of the 2009 US Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), South Korea—like some of
Washington’s NATO allies in Central and
Eastern Europe—resisted strongly limiting
nuclear responses only to nuclear threat con-
tingencies. But this issue will need to be revis-
ited if there is to be any serious move towards
reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in
security doctrine, and nuclear disarmament
itself, in the years ahead.
2.8 Japan
Voices in Japan in favour of developing
nuclear weapons or stationing them on Japa-
nese soil are much more muted than in South
Korea, because of the continuing resonance in
the national political culture of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, but it should not be assumed they do
not exist. Concern is strong about both North
Korea and China as potential threats—the
latter particularly since the confrontation in the
East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands—and there is, despite all the abundant
anti-nuclear rhetoric—a strong attachment not
22. Pinkston, D (2013), So˘n’gun Korea’s Military First
Ideology and the Pyo˘ngjin Line, unpublished International
Crisis Group presentation to CACDA Arms Control and
Strategic Stability Symposium, Beijing, 9 August 2013.
For some flavour of the complexities, contradictions and
variability of the North Korean position see Noland, M
(2013), Are North and South Korea Back in Business?,
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2013, http://www
.cfr.org/north-korea/north-south-korea-back-business/
p31232
23. Jiyoon K, Friedhoof K, Chungku K (2013) The Asan
Public Opinion Report- February 2013 http://asaninst
.org/eng/03_publications/report_detail.php?seq=100468
&ipage=1&nums=1&ca=0
24. Speech at the 2013 Carnegie International Nuclear
Policy Conference, 8 April 2013, Washington DC
(author’s note); Sanger D (2010) In U.S., South Korean
Makes Case for Nuclear Arms. The New York Times, 10
April 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/world/
asia/in-us-south-korean-makes-case-for-nuclear-
arms.html?ref=davidesanger
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only to US extended deterrence, guaranteed by
the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security and in many subsequent communica-
tions but to extended nuclear deterrence. DPJ
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada told the US
administration in 2009 that Japan did not
demand in this context any commitment con-
flicting with the goal of a world without
nuclear weapons, but subsequent LDP admin-
istrations have been reluctant to go even this
far.25 Former UN Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs Nobuyasu Abe has
rightly described as ‘paradoxical’ and a
‘dilemma’ Japan’s long-standing passion for
both sheltering under a nuclear umbrella and
nuclear disarmament.26
2.9 Other US Allies
There are other US allies and partners in Asia
and the Pacific which shelter under its nuclear
umbrella with varying degrees of certainty in
its availability and conviction as to its neces-
sity. Australia, a beneficiary under the ANZUS
Treaty of a formal commitment, like that given
to South Korea and Japan, that in the event of
an armed attack the United States would ‘act to
meet the common danger’,27 has assumed that
a nuclear threat or attack would result in a
nuclear response, and said as much in succes-
sive Defence White Papers,28 although no con-
firmation of this from the United States has
ever been on the public record.29 In 2010,
importantly, Australia itself put on record its
willingness to accept that indeed it was only
nuclear attack, not other threat contingencies,
that could generate a nuclear response. In their
statement responding to the release of the US
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Foreign Min-
ister Stephen Smith and Defence Minister
John Faulkner said ‘The United States knows
that Australia would be comfortable if the
United States were to reach its objective of
making deterrence of nuclear attack the sole
purpose of its nuclear weapons, although the
NPR notes that significant work is required to
establish the conditions to do so safely’.30
There are other US relationships in the
region—treaty-based in the case of Thailand
and the Philippines, statute based in the case
of Taiwan, and more informal in the case of
Singapore—which might be thought to carry
with them security guarantees of varying
degrees of force. But in every case, the protec-
tion of the US nuclear umbrella is at best
implicit rather than explicit. The question that
needs to be addressed by all of them is whether
there is any utility now, if there ever was, in
that possible protection, and whether the risks
involved in relying on nuclear deterrence out-
weigh any possible rewards.
3. Revisiting the Arguments for Nuclear
Disarmament
If progress is to be made on nuclear
disarmament—and by extension on avoiding
further proliferation of nuclear weapons, for
the two issues are inextricably connected—
persuasive, hard-headed cost-benefit argu-
25. See Thakur R, Evans G (eds) (2013) Nuclear
Weapons: the State of Play, p.48. Centre for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament, Canberra. This followed
strong advocacy in favour of the United States and its
allies supporting at least a ‘sole purpose’ posture: see
ICNND (2009) Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical
Agenda for Global Policymakers, paras 17.28–32. Inter-
national Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament, Canberra.
26. Abe N, Tosaki H (2013) Untangling Japan’s Nuclear
Dilemma: Deterrence before Disarmament. Nuclear Abo-
lition Forum 2, 34–9
27. ‘Each party recognises that an armed attack in the
Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to
its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitu-
tional processes’ (ANZUS Treaty, 1951, Article IV).
28. For example, ‘We will continue to rely on the
extended deterrence of the US nuclear capability to deter
any nuclear threat or attack on Australia’: Department of
Defence (1994) Defence White Paper: Defending Austra-
lia, para 9.7, and most recently, ‘Finally, as long as nuclear
weapons exist we rely on the nuclear forces of the United
States to deter nuclear attack on Australia’: Department of
Defence (2013) Defence White Paper 2013 para 3.41.
29. See Tanter R (2009) Rethinking Extended Nuclear
Deterrence in the Defence of Australia. The Asia-Pacific
Journal, 50-3-09, 14 December, 2009, http://www
.japanfocus.org/-Richard-Tanter/3269#sthash.8KRysIUl
.dpuf
30. Smith S, Faulkner J (2010) Release of the United
States Nuclear Posture Review. Joint Media Release 7
April 2010, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/
2010/fa-s100407.html
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ments for reducing and ultimately eliminating
reliance on nuclear weapons must be under-
stood and accepted by policy-makers in the
nuclear-armed states, in Asia and the Pacific as
elsewhere. Recognising the force of such
arguments—in particular those against placing
reliance on nuclear deterrence—is never likely
to be a sufficient condition for achieving the
elimination of nuclear weapons, but there
cannot be much doubt that it is a necessary
one.
The relevant arguments fall into three
groups, all of which have recently been
gaining more traction, although whether
enough to make any policy difference remains
to be seen. First, there are the traditional
humanitarian considerations, that nuclear
weapons are morally and environmentally
indefensible challenges to our common
humanity. Second, there are increasingly reso-
nant financial arguments, that with all the
other budgetary pressures on contemporary
governments, nuclear weapons are simply an
indefensibly costly misallocation of resources.
Third, and most pertinently for present pur-
poses, there are strategic arguments: that for
all the long tradition of reliance on nuclear
weapons to maintain peace and stability, this
dependence is misplaced, and that such deter-
rent utility as nuclear weapons may have is
outweighed by the huge risks associated with
their retention by any state.
3.1 Humanitarian
The argument for the moral indefensibility of
nuclear weapons is familiar and powerful.
When the first atomic bomb exploded over
Hiroshima, it made no distinction between
combatants and civilians, old and young, or
victims and those trying to help them. Virtually,
all those within a half kilometre radius were
incinerated, boiled or crushed to death, and
those in surrounding areas died soon after of
burns, wounds, or within months of radiation
illness, bringing total estimated deaths to as
many as 170,000. And these numbers are small
compared with the casualties that may be
expected from later generation weapons.
However concealed by the language of deter-
rence, doctrine, countervalue, and counterforce
strategy, warhead reliability and the like, the
moral bottom line is the terrible, indiscriminate
human suffering, immediate and longer term,
these weapons cause.
The almost indescribable horror associated
with any nuclear weapon use informed the
very first resolution of the UN General Assem-
bly in 1946, and has been at the heart of all
disarmament advocacy since. Humanitarian
arguments have been recently gaining new
momentum. The 2010 NPT Review Confer-
ence Final Document expressed ‘deep concern
at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences
of any use of nuclear weapons, and reaf-
firm[ed] the need for all states at all times to
comply with applicable international law,
including international humanitarian law’.31
The theme was picked up in major statements
made by Switzerland on behalf of 34 countries
in the First Committee of the UN General
Assembly in October 2012, and by South
Africa on behalf of 80 countries at the Geneva
NPT Preparatory Committee meeting on 24
April 1913, emphasising ‘the immense, uncon-
trollable destructive capacity and indiscrimi-
nate nature of these weapons’.32 The position
that nuclear weapons breached principles
at the heart of international humanitarian
law—the distinction between combatants
and civilians, proportionality and precaution—
was repeatedly articulated at the Norway-
sponsored Conference on the Humanitarian
Impact of Nuclear Weapons held in Oslo in
March 2013. Although as of mid-2013, the
nuclear weapon-states and most of their allies
remained resistant to committing to this enter-
prise, it can be expected to build further
momentum by the time of a planned follow-up
conference in Mexico in early 2014.
31. Final Document: 2010 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, p. 19. United Nations, New York
32. 67th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee Joint Statement on the humanitarian
dimension of nuclear disarmament (22 October 2012, New
York); Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for
the 2015 Review Conference, Joint Statement on the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (24 April 2013,
Geneva).
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The humanitarian argument against nuclear
weapons use is also based on their environ-
mental impact. As the World Commission on
the Environment and Development, chaired by
Gro Harlem Brundtland, stated in its report
Our Common Future in 1987: ‘The likely con-
sequences of nuclear war make other threats
to the environment pale into insignificance.
Nuclear weapons represent a qualitatively new
step in the development of warfare. One ther-
monuclear bomb can have an explosive power
greater than all the explosives used in wars
since the invention of gunpowder. In addition
to the destructive effects of blast and heat,
immensely magnified by these weapons, they
introduce a new lethal agent—onising
radiation–that extends lethal effects over both
space and time’.33
In addition to these effects, the ‘nuclear
winter’ impact of a major nuclear exchange,
even one confined to a single region like South
Asia, would be globally devastating. With mil-
lions of tons of smoke lofted to high altitude
and absorbing sunlight, surface temperatures
and precipitation would dramatically fall,
threatening a significant fraction of the world’s
food supply—such ‘nuclear famine’ would put
at risk the lives of nearly a billion people. The
point is also made, by those who calculate
nuclear winter impacts, that they involve ‘self-
assured destruction’: whether or not a major
nuclear attack provokes nuclear retaliation by
another state, the damage will have been
done—and ensure starvation in the attacking
country itself as well as elsewhere.34
Both the direct human impact and the longer
term environmental impact motivated the chal-
lenge to the legality of nuclear weapons
mounted in the International Court of Justice by
the UN General Assembly on the initiative of
the World Health Organization, which resulted
in the 1996Advisory Opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. There
were many formidable arguments made against
legality, including that use of nuclear weapons
would be contrary to international humanitar-
ian law because they cannot discriminate
between civilians and combatant; would violate
the right to life; would in some circumstances
amount to genocide; would be contrary to exist-
ing norms relating to the safeguarding and pro-
tection of the environment; would be a serious
danger to future generations; and would be,
even in the case of use in self-defence, dispro-
portionate and therefore unlawful in most
cases. Reinforcing arguments included that
since nuclear weapons have not be used since
1945, it can be inferred there is a rule of cus-
tomary international law prohibiting this; and
that the UN General Assembly has declared the
use of nuclear weapons to be illegal and in
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
Having analysed all the arguments, the Court
decided unanimously that ‘There is in neither
customary nor conventional international law
any specific authorisation of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons’; and by seven votes to seven
(with the President’s casting vote) that ‘The
threat or use of nuclear weapons would gener-
ally be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law’.
Although the Court added the qualification that
it ‘cannot conclude definitively whether the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance
of self-defence, in which the very survival of a
State would be at stake’, it follows from its
opinion that there is no circumstance in which a
State can be sure that any use it makes of
nuclear weapons will be lawful. Their use
plainly is unlawful in most circumstances—and
may well be unlawful in all circumstances.
3.2 Financial
At the other end of the moral spectrum,
perhaps, but no less powerful in practice for
that, there is the argument that nuclear
weapons are simply indefensibly costly.35 As
33. Brundtland Commission (1987) Our Common Future,
p. 295. Report of the World Commission on Environment
and Development, United Nations, New York
34. Robock A, Toon O B (2012) Self-assured destruction:
The climate impacts of nuclear war. Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 68, 66–74
35. See generally Page J, Thakur R (2013) Nuclear
Weapons -The Opportunity Costs. APLN/CNND Policy
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estimated by Global Zero researchers Bruce
Blair and Mathew Brown in 2011—from
manifestly imperfect but the best available
data—the full cost (including mitigating health
and environmental consequences) of world-
wide spending on nuclear weapons by the
nuclear-armed states was then running at
$104.9 billion: in that year the United States
spent $61.3 billion, Russia $14.8 billion,
China $7.6 billion, France $6 billion, United
Kingdom $5.5 billion, India $4.9 billion, Paki-
stan $2.2 billion, Israel $1.9 billion and North
Korea $0.7 billion. They further estimated,
taking into account planned worldwide
upgrading of nuclear arsenals, that aggregate
spending by these states over the next decade
will exceed $1000 billion, or one trillion
dollars.36 These extraordinary amounts raise
questions both about the military utility of this
expenditure, and its opportunity cost.
As to military cost-benefit, the history of the
nuclear age provides ample evidence that
nuclear weapons do not enable reductions in
spending on conventional forces. As will be
discussed below, in the context of strategic
arguments for nuclear disarmament, the indis-
criminate, highly destructive (including self-
destructive) power of nuclear weapons renders
them unusable—except possibly as an abso-
lute last resort in the most desperate of circum-
stances. Generations of military leaders have
decided, on perfectly rational grounds, that
they cannot serve as a substitute for capable
conventional forces. Now, in the current—and
likely continuing—global climate of financial
stringency, nuclear forces, rather than support-
ing conventional capabilities, risk undermin-
ing them. The wisdom of using large
proportions of defence budgets on weapons
that are essentially unusable and which make a
highly questionable contribution to meeting
contemporary security challenges is coming
increasingly into question.
As to social cost-benefit, there is a real issue
as to whether some or all of the money being
spent to little purpose on nuclear weapons
would be better directed to non-military use,
both internationally and domestically. One area
where savings could be employed more pro-
ductively internationally would be to help
achieve the UN Millennium Development
Goals. It has been estimated that achieving
unmet goals by the 2015 deadline—improving
more than 1.6 billion lives in the process—
would cost $40–60 billion, which is about half
the projected annual global expenditure on
nuclear weapons over this period. Within
nuclear-armed states there are many examples
of how nuclear weapons budgets could argu-
ably be better spent. In the United States, for
instance, $400 million—the 25 per cent pro-
jected increase for stockpile support—would
provide more than 10,000 university students
with 4-year scholarships. And in Pakistan, for
$815 million—a little over one third of its
present nuclear weapons-related expenditure—
11,000 schools could be funded.37
3.3 Strategic
The strategic arguments against nuclear
weapons fall into three baskets: that they are of
much more dubious deterrent utility than
usually thought, despite their destructive
ferocity; that their lack of utility is com-
pounded by their fragility as a basis for main-
taining stable peace; and that they are
anachronistic, in that whatever the balance of
risk and reward may have been during the Cold
War years, in the world of the 21st century the
dangers associated with their acquisition and
retention far outweigh any possible returns.
3.3.1 The Utility of Nuclear Deterrence
None of the main arguments in favour of the
utility of nuclear deterrence have, on closer
examination, anything like the force they are
usually seen to possess.Brief no. 1, June 2013. Australian National University,
http://cnnd.anu.edu.au/policy-briefs/
36. Blair B, Brown M (2011) World Spending on Nuclear
Weapons Surpasses $1 Trillion per Decade. Global Zero
http://www.globalzero.org/files/gz_nuclear_weapons
_cost_study.pdf. All figures cited are in US dollars.
37. Adrianna Wolaver A (2010) The Real Price of Nuclear
Weapons. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation http://
wagingpeacetoday.blogspot.com.au/2010/08/real-price-
of-nuclear-weapons.html.
Evans: Nuclear Deterrence 101
© 2013 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
The first, and most common, is that nuclear
weapons have deterred, and will continue to
deter, war between the major powers—that the
balance of nuclear terror between the United
States and the Soviet Union maintained peace
throughout the Cold War, and has done so
since between other pairs of potential belliger-
ents, including India and Pakistan, India and
China, and China and the United States.
While nuclear weapons on the other side
have always constituted a formidable argument
for caution—and fear of their possible use was
obviously crucial, for example, in securing the
back-downs on both sides that ended the Cuban
missile crisis—it is strongly arguable that their
impact has been exaggerated. Certainly, there is
simply no evidence that at any stage during the
Cold War years either the Soviet Union or the
United States ever wanted to cold bloodedly
initiate war, and were only constrained from
doing so by the existence of the other’s nuclear
weapons.38
We know that knowledge of the existence
on the other side of supremely destructive
weapons (as with chemical and biological
weapons before 1939) has not stopped war in
the past between major powers. Nor has the
experience or prospect of massive damage to
cities and killing of civilians caused leaders in
the past to back down—including after Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki, where the historical evi-
dence is now very strong that it was not the
nuclear attacks which were the key factor in
driving Japan to sue for peace but the Soviet
declaration of war later that same week.39
Although the context there was different—
terminating an existing war rather than deter-
ring a new one—the point remains that
concern about being on the receiving end of
the extreme destructive power of nuclear
weapons may simply not be, in itself, as deci-
sive for decision-makers as usually presumed.
Other explanations may be more important.
A plausible non-nuclear explanation for
the ‘Long Peace’ since 1945, although this
issue is still intensely debated, is that what has
stopped—and will continue to stop—the great
powers from deliberately starting wars against
each other is, more than anything else, a
realisation, after the experience of World War
II and in the light of all the rapid technological
advances that followed it, that the damage that
would be inflicted by any war would be unbe-
lievably horrific, and far outweighing, in
today’s economically interdependent world,
any conceivable benefit to be derived.40
A second familiar argument for the strate-
gic utility of nuclear weapons is that they deter
large-scale conventional attacks. The idea of
nuclear weapons as a strategic equaliser, nec-
essary to compensate for inferior conventional
weapon capability, remains at the heart of
Pakistan’s justification for its nuclear arsenal.
And North Korea undoubtedly believes that
possession of even a very small number of
nuclear weapons constitutes some deterrent
against forcible regime change, with the expe-
rience of Serbia in 1999, Iraq in 2003 and
Libya in 2011 no doubt reinforcing its percep-
tion that states without such capability are par-
ticularly vulnerable.
There is some weight in these arguments,
and the extent to which the ‘strategic equaliser’
theme, in particular, is embedded in policy-
makers’ consciousness—including in Russia
and China, in the context of their perceptions of
US conventional superiority—will undoubt-
edly in practice be one of the most powerful
inhibitors in achieving the ultimate complete
elimination of nuclear weapons.41 But on closer
examination, there is less reason for confidence
that nuclear weapons have in the past, or will in
the future, guarantee immunity for their pos-
sessors against conventional assault.
There is a long list of examples where non-
nuclear powers have either directly attacked
nuclear powers or have not been deterred
by the prospect of their intervention:, for38. See, e.g. Doyle, J E (2013) Why Eliminate Nuclear
Weapons?, Survival 55, 13–15.
39. See Wilson W (2013) Five Myths About Nuclear
Weapons, pp. 21–53. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New
York. For the Japanese scholarship see especially
Hasagawa, T (ed.) (2007) The End of the Pacific War:
Reappraisals, esp ch 4. Stanford University Press.
40. Pinker S (2011) The Better Angels of our Nature: The
Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes, Chapter 5,
especially pp. 288–94. Penguin, London.
41. See the discussion in the final section below of what is
described there as the ‘geopolitical hurdle’ to abolition.
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example, the Korea, Vietnam, Yom Kippur,
Falklands, two Afghanistan and first Gulf
wars. The calculation evidently made in each
case was that a nuclear response would be
inhibited by the prevailing taboo on the use of
such weapons (on which more below), at least
in circumstances where the very survival of the
state was not at stake.
Moreover, the confidence that seems to
have moved some smaller states, like North
Korea, to think that a handful of nuclear
weapons is their ultimate guarantor against
external regime-change-motivated interven-
tion is not well founded. While no doubt com-
plicating the calculations of a would-be
intervener, and possibly raising the costs of
victory, weapons that it would be manifestly
suicidal to use are not ultimately a very cred-
ible deterrent, nor are those that are not backed
by the infrastructure (e.g. missile submarines)
that would give them a reasonable prospect of
surviving to mount a retaliatory attack. In the
case of North Korea, its strongest military
deterrent remains what it has always been. And
that is its capacity to mount a devastating con-
ventional artillery attack on Seoul and its envi-
rons: there is not much doubt that South
Korea, supported by the United States, would
quickly overwhelm the North in any military
conflict but not without its capital first experi-
encing massive damage. Pyongyang does not
need nuclear weapons to give Seoul and Wash-
ington military pause.
The argument that nuclear weapons deter
conventional attacks is vulnerable from another
perspective. There are cases where the presence
on both sides of nuclear weapons, rather than
operating as a constraining factor, has been
seen as giving one side the opportunity to
launch small military actions without serious
fear of nuclear reprisal (because of the extraor-
dinarily high stakes involved in such a
response): as with Pakistan in Kargil in 1999,
and North Korea in the sinking of the Cheonan
and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. It
may be that—rather than, as the old conserva-
tive line would have it, ‘the absence of nuclear
weapons would make the world safe for con-
ventional wars’—it is the presence of nuclear
weapons that has made the world safer for such
wars. There is substantial quantitative, as well
as anecdotal, evidence to support what is
known in the literature as the ‘stability/
instability paradox’—the notion that what may
appear a stable nuclear balance actually encour-
ages more violence under the shelter of the
nuclear overhang.42
A third major argument for the strategic
utility of nuclear weapons is that they operate
as a hedge, or form of insurance, against
nuclear blackmail. China, for one, has often
articulated this as a key reason for acquiring
and maintaining its nuclear arsenal. But, while
firmly embedded in policy-maker conscious-
ness, this argument appears to be based on a
false premise. As already discussed in the
opening section of this article, the belief that
nuclear weapon possession (or superiority)
means more effective compellent threats—a
greater ability to get one’s way in any diplo-
matic confrontation—is simply not backed by
any historical evidence.43 And it underesti-
mates the force of the real-world taboo that
unquestionably inhibits not only the use, but
the threat of use, of these weapons.
A fourth strategic argument for nuclear
weapons is that they will deter any chemical or
biological weapons attack. This is claimed by
some nuclear-armed states and their allies—in
particular as the reason why Saddam Hussein
did not use chemical weapons in 2003—but it
lacks plausibility. There are a number of other
reasons why the Iraqis may not have used these
weapons then, including a perception that
coalition forces were well protected against
such attack, and a fear of individual force com-
manders of being tried for war crimes. More
generally, given that chemical weapons have
nothing like the destructive potential of
nuclear weapons—and never will, although
the future risk factor is higher with biological
weapons—it is difficult to paint any plausible
scenario in which nuclear, as distinct from
conventional, retaliation would be a propor-
tional, necessary, and therefore credible
42. Rauchhaus, R (2009) Evaluating the Nuclear Peace
Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach, Journal of Conflict
Resolution 53, 258–277.
43. See Sechser T S, Fuhrmann M (2013), footnote 3
above and accompanying text.
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response. The United States made no nuclear
threat against Iraq, and there is no evidence
whatever that it would have done so, or would
have needed to, had Saddam’s forces used
chemical weapons.44 It is similarly inconceiv-
able that the United States would even have
contemplated responding with nuclear wea-
pons to the use of chemical weapons in Syria
in 2013.
The fifth, and weakest strategic argument
of all for nuclear weapons, although it is still
sometimes heard, is that they may be needed to
deter nuclear terrorism. Nuclear weapons are
manifestly neither strategically, tactically nor
politically useful for this purpose. Terrorists do
not usually have territory, industry, a popula-
tion or a regular army which could be targeted
with nuclear weapons. And to conduct nuclear
strikes on another state, even one demonstra-
bly complicit in a terrorist attack, would raise
huge legal, moral, political and strategic
issues. If a nuclear strike was not contem-
plated in Afghanistan after 9/11, when would it
ever be?
The more general point that runs through
many of these responses to the arguments for
nuclear deterrence is that nuclear weapons
really are inherently unusable—and because
key players know that, even if so many are
reluctant to openly concede it, nuclear deter-
rence has nothing like the power it is com-
monly assumed to have. Military commanders
have long understood that there are formidable
practical obstacles involved in the use (and by
extension threatened use) of these weapons at
both the tactical and strategic level, not least
the damage they can cause to one’s own side
and to any territory being fought over.45
Beyond the practical obstacles, there is the
profound normative taboo which unquestion-
ably exists internationally against any use of
nuclear weapons, at least in circumstances
where the very survival of a state is not at
stake. Since the early 1950s—when it began to
sink in that their destructive capacity really
was infinitely greater than anything previously
seen—such deliberate use has been seen as
inconceivable by the leaders of any country
thinking of itself as civilised, and wanting to
be thought so by others. Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower and Kennedy rejected military
advice to use nuclear weapons in the Korean
War, the Taiwan Straits crisis and the Cuban
missile crisis, and the force of the taboo has if
anything since grown. Even John Foster Dulles
said that if the United States had used nuclear
weapons in Korea, Vietnam, or against China
over Taiwan, ‘we’d be finished as far as
present-day world opinion was concerned’.46
There is some very recent published
research47 suggesting, a little alarmingly, that
the nuclear taboo is not felt nearly as strongly
as previously thought by the US public. But
among policy-makers worldwide the taboo
seems, in the judgement of at least this practi-
tioner, to be as strong as ever. And it is confi-
dence in the existence of that taboo—and the
effective unusability of nuclear weapons that
goes with it, for one’s opponents as well as
oneself—that may be thought to explain why
so many military risks have been taken over the
years in defiance of that supposed deterrent.
The sixth, and remaining, strategic argu-
ment for the utility of nuclear deterrence that
needs to be addressed is that possession of and
willingness to use nuclear weapons has con-
tributed to non-proliferation, at least in one
context, viz. ‘extended nuclear deterrence’.
The willingness of the United States to commit
its nuclear capability to protect allies from pos-
sible attack has long been thought to be crucial
in dissuading especially Japan and South
Korea from acquiring deterrent nuclear capa-
bility of their own. There is force to this claim,
although strong anti-nuclear sentiment in
Japan continues to act as a disincentive to any
government going down that path.48
44. ICNND (2009) Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Prac-
tical Agenda for Global Policymakers, endnote to para
6.18, p 238. International Commission on Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament, Canberra.
45. ICNND (2009), para 6.2.
46. Quoted in Tannenwald N (2007) The Nuclear Taboo,
p. 173. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
47. Press D G, Sagan S D, Valentino B A (2013) Atomic
Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions
and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, American Political
Science Review 107, 188–206.
48. See generally O’Neil A (2013) Asia, the US and
Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the
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But it can be argued equally strongly, cer-
tainly in the context of the United States and its
allies, both in Asia and the Pacific and in
Europe, that extended nuclear deterrence
could be replaced by ‘extended deterrence’—
that is, with the United States dropping its
nuclear umbrella component but guaranteeing
allies full protection against any threat contin-
gency through its conventional weapons
capability, which is presently overwhelming,
and will be hugely formidable for the foresee-
able future even in a world of greater conven-
tional arms balance. While this is not to
underestimate the political and psychological
comfort involved in having nuclear weapons
notionally available to respond not only to
nuclear attack, but attack by other weapons
threatening the very survival of the state, it is
hard to argue objectively that any actual dimi-
nution of allied states’ security would be
involved, not least because of the unlikelihood
in practice (given the humanitarian taboo, and
environmental risks, including of self-assured
destruction) that nuclear weapons would ever
actually be used in practice.
A more robust response to the argument
that nuclear deterrence has contributed to non-
proliferation is that the contrary is more likely
to be true. Successive international commis-
sion reports—the Canberra Commission in
1996, Blix Commission in 2006, and the
Australia–Japan ICNND in 2009—have
argued that so long as any state retains nuclear
weapons others will want them, and that prog-
ress towards elimination is crucial to ensure
non-proliferation. Successive NPT Review
Conferences have made it clear how strong is
the perceived connection between disarma-
ment and non-proliferation, and how difficult
it is to strengthen the non-proliferation regime
so long as the nuclear-weapon states are reluc-
tant to make significant progress towards
elimination.
That view has been endorsed in what some
might think an unlikely quarter, the Congres-
sional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the United States, the 2009 final report of
which observed that ‘other nations may not
show the nuclear restraint the United States
desires or support non-proliferation efforts if
the nuclear weapon states take no further
agreed steps to decrease their reliance on
nuclear arms’.49 When one’s goal is to achieve
a world with less rather than more nuclear
weapons, bloody minded resistance to
strengthening the non-proliferation regime
may be anything but a rational response to
disappointment over slow progress on disar-
mament, but in the experience of this practi-
tioner it is unquestionably a reality.
3.3.2 The Fragility of Nuclear Deterrence
Some might be minded to conclude from the
preceding discussion that if nuclear weapons
really do have little or no strategic utility, and
are wholly unlikely ever to be deliberately
used, then policy-makers should be able to live
comfortably with their continued existence.
But that does not follow at all. So long as any
are retained by anyone, the risk is all too real of
stumbling into a nuclear exchange through
accident, miscalculation, system error, or
sabotage, and any such exchange would be
potentially catastrophic for life on this planet
as we know it. Whatever the utility of nuclear
deterrence might be thought to be, it has
always been an extremely fragile basis for
maintaining stable peace, for three main
reasons.
First, nuclear deterrence depends on ratio-
nal actors on both sides, each making rational
judgements about the risk factors involved.
Political actors and circumstances can change,
and it cannot be assumed that complete ratio-
nality will always prevail in the stress of a
real-time crisis. As Hedley Bull has said,
‘mutual nuclear deterrence . . . does not make
nuclear war impossible, but simply renders it
irrational’. And as he also wryly put it, a ratio-
nal strategic man is one ‘who on further
21st Century. Routledge, London; Medcalf R (ed) (2011)
Weathering Change: The Future of Extended Nuclear
Deterrence. Lowy Institute for International Policy,
Sydney.
49. Congressional Commission (2009) America’s Strate-
gic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Com-
mission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, p.
66. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC.
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acquaintance reveals himself as a university
professor of unusual intellectual subtlety’.50
Second, nuclear deterrence depends on
there being no human or system errors. There
is a major risk not only of human error or
misjudgement under stress but of miscommu-
nication (the risks here now compounded by
the sophistication of cyber weapons) and of
basic system error, with harmless events being
read as threatening (as, e.g. in 1995 when Rus-
sia’s President Boris Yeltsin was advised that
he should immediately retaliate against an
incoming NATO missile, which proved to be a
Norwegian scientific rocket launch).
Much archival evidence of the Cold War
years—when command and control systems
on both sides were thought to be highly sophis-
ticated, and were more so than are some
between potential nuclear adversaries today—
has now revealed how close to calamity the
world regularly came, much more so than was
understood at the time. It is not a matter of
good policy or good management that the
world has avoided a nuclear weapons catastro-
phe for nearly 70 years: it is sheer dumb luck.
These risks are dramatically compounded
when nuclear armed states maintain nuclear
weapons on dangerously high ‘launch-on-
warning’ alert status—as is still the case, more
than two decades after the end of the Cold War,
for almost 2,000 weapons in the US and
Russian arsenals. Reports in 2013 of security
failures and acute morale problems at US
missile launch sites add further alarming
weight to this concern.51
Third, new technical developments may
make old calculations redundant. There is a
risk, in particular, that new generation conven-
tional attack weapons, or missile defence
systems, will be developed that will be so
sophisticated and powerful as to create real
doubts in states’ minds about the survivability
of their retaliatory, second-strike capability. In
an extreme crisis situation this could encour-
age such states to strike first; and at the very
least is likely to encourage them to expand
their nuclear armouries, with all the potential
that has for setting off new nuclear arms races.
3.3.3 Nuclear Deterrence as a
Dangerous Anachronism
Even for those who will never abandon the
position that nuclear weapons—and the fear of
mutually assured destruction that went with
them—were crucial in avoiding war between
the Soviet Union and United States for nearly
five decades, it is hard to argue that things have
not changed. The threats with which the world
is most concerned now—terrorism, biological
weapon attack, cyber attack, climate change
and health pandemics—are not those which
nuclear weapons can in way help to address.
As the threats have changed, so too have
the risks associated with the retention of
nuclear weapon stockpiles. As Lord Browne
and Ian Kearns argue in a 2012 European
Leadership Network policy brief, ‘the nuclear
order that is emerging, of smaller global
nuclear weapon stockpiles overall, but of
weapons distributed across more states in more
unstable regions, has the potential to be less
stable than the Cold War and is more likely, as
a consequence, to see nuclear weapons used’.52
This was the central argument made in the very
influential series of articles written since 2007,
most recently in March 2013, by the four US
statesmen—realists all—Henry Kissinger,
George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn,
concluding that with the end of the Cold War,
nuclear weapons had outlived whatever utility
they might have had:
It is far from certain that today’s world can
successfully replicate the Cold War Soviet–
American deterrence by ‘mutually assured50. The first quote is from Bull H (1995) The AnarchicalSociety, p. 234. Macmillan, London; the second from Bull
H (1961) The Control of the Arms Race, p. 48. Institute of
Strategic Studies, London.
51. Carroll J (2013) US nuclear weapons poised for catas-
trophe, The Boston Globe (26 August 2013), http://
www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/08/26/nuclear-
tipped-missiles-posed-for-nightmare-holocaust/
VZ3KQOUsAUFm4qfuchjmCI/story.html
52. Browne D, Kearns I (2012) NATO, Russia, and the
Nuclear Disarmament Agenda: Reflections Post Chicago,
p. 5. European Leadership Network (ELN), London,
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/
2012/08/07/a7e51c12/NATO%20Russia%20and%20
Disarmament.pdf
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destruction’—the threat of imposing unaccept-
able damage on the adversary. That was based
essentially on a bipolar world. But when a large
and growing number of nuclear adversaries con-
front multiple perceived threats, the relative
restraint of the Cold War will be difficult to
sustain. The risk that deterrence will fail and
that nuclear weapons will be used increases
dramatically.53
4. Making Disarmament Happen
Understanding and accepting the compelling
force of the arguments against nuclear
weapons possession and retention is a neces-
sary starting point for nuclear disarmament,
but it certainly will not get policy-makers to
the finishing line. What are the key steps that
now need to be taken, and can the major
obstacles that will be encountered along the
way be overcome?
The beginning of wisdom for any credible
strategy for disarmament is to recognise that
this is never likely to be achieved as a straight-
line process, but will need to involve two
distinct stages, first ‘minimisation’ then ‘elimi-
nation’, with some inevitable discontinuity
between them. The International Commission
on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarma-
ment (ICNND) took the view that a target date
of 2025 could be set for the achievement of a
minimisation objective—optimistic, but not
wholly unrealistic provided serious momen-
tum started to build early. This would involve
reducing the global stockpile of all existing
warheads to no more than 2,000 (a maximum
of 500 each for the United States and Russia
and 1,000 for the other nuclear-armed states
combined), with all states being committed by
then to ‘No First Use’—and with these doctri-
nal declarations being given real credibility by
dramatically reduced weapons deployments
and launch readiness.54
But as much as it wanted to move quickly
thereafter to elimination, the Commission took
the view that it might diminish the political
believability of the whole disarmament argu-
ment to set a further specific timeline on
getting from low numbers to zero. It
recognised that this involved not just further
stages on the same incremental continuum
but overcoming three high hurdles—
psychological, technical and geopolitical—as
to each of which it was simply impossible, at
least for now, to attach a credible target date.55
The psychological hurdle is simply giving up
the status and prestige that seems traditionally
to have been associated with membership of
the nuclear weapons club.
The technical hurdle, which applies univer-
sally, is verification and enforcement. Getting
to zero will be impossible without every state
being confident that every other is complying,
that any violation of the prohibition is readily
detected, and that any breakout is controllable.
Those conditions do not exist at the moment,
although important work is being done on veri-
fication by the United Kingdom, Norway and
United States, and this part of the problem may
well be solved over the next decade or so.
Enforcement, however, will continue to be a
major stumbling block for the foreseeable
future, with the Security Council’s credibility
on this issue manifestly at odds with the reten-
tion of veto powers by the Permanent Five.
That said, no institutional problem is insoluble
given the political will to cooperate, and if
sufficient self-reinforcing momentum devel-
ops behind the whole disarmament enterprise
over the years ahead, this difficulty might not
loom as large in the endgame as it does now.
The geopolitical hurdle is likely to be the
biggest: the creation of an environment in the
key regions of North East Asia and South Asia
(and the Middle East) stable enough for no
country to have any serious concern about
existential threats, even if not all sources of
potential tension have disappeared. Many
commentators argue that nuclear disarmament
cannot be pursued in a vacuum, and it is only
in the context of a wholly favourable overall53. Shultz G P, Perry W J, Kissinger H, Nunn S (2013)
Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks. The Wall Street
Journal, 5 March 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887324338604578325912939001772.html
54. ICNND (2009) Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Prac-
tical Agenda for Global Policymakers, paras 1.81-38.
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament, Canberra.
55. ICNND (2009), paras 19.5–26
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political and security environment—when rel-
evant regional and other tensions have been
eliminated or dramatically reduced—that any
serious movement could ever be contemplated.
A familiar variation on this argument is that
without a major rebalancing of conventional
weapons capability between pairs of potential
adversaries where there is presently a signifi-
cant imbalance, no movement at all on disar-
mament can be expected.
It is important not to overstate this posi-
tion. Every possible diplomatic effort should
continue to be made to soothe current ten-
sions, anticipate potential flashpoints, build
confidence, and ultimately settle outstanding
issues between potential adversaries, both for
their own sake and for the positive contribution
this would make to nuclear disarmament diplo-
macy. But to make any movement on disarma-
ment conditional upon the resolution of
regional conflicts, the settlement of major
power tensions, or the achievement of real
balance in the conventional military capability
of relevant pairs of states is to set oneself up for
failure, on the model of the old saw: ‘If we are
weak how can we compromise? If we are strong
why should we compromise?’ Movement
towards disarmament should not be held com-
pletely hostage to improvement in the overall
geopolitical climate: the two developments
should be seen as complementary and mutually
reinforcing and properly pursued in tandem.
As strewn with obstacles as the road ahead
may appear to be, there are ways of moving
forward in each of the crucial pairs of relation-
ships that will determine how far and fast
nuclear disarmament proceeds. In each case
the key to progress, as in all diplomacy, is to
try to understand the interests and perspectives
of the other side, and to find ways of accom-
modating them by all means short of putting at
real risk genuinely vital interests of one’s own.
As to the United States and Russia, the key
to recommencing serious further arms reduc-
tion negotiations will be for Washington to
give Moscow an acceptable response to its
concerns, exaggerated though they may be
(and as absurd as any such anxiety might
appear more than 20 years after the end of the
Cold War), about BMD and new long-range
conventional weapons systems seriously
diminishing its second-strike retaliatory capa-
bility. A good start has been made in this
respect on missile defence with Washington’s
cancellation in March 2013 of the final phase
of a Europe-based system, involving intercep-
tors which Russia had long argued might have
the ability to target its own Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles, thus reducing strategic
stability.56
A long menu of steps designed to break the
two countries out of ‘Cold War autopilot’
mode has been usefully proposed in a
report published in early 2013, Building
Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region,
co-authored by former UK Defence Minister
Des Browne, former Russian Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov, former US Senator Sam Nunn,
and Munich Security Conference Chair,
Wolfgang Ischinger.57 Its recommendations
include specific cooperative strategies on
missile defence, acceptance of legally binding
limits on the development and deployment
of prompt-strike conventional forces, new
confidence-building measures on conventional
forces generally, reciprocal commitments to
progressively removing strategic forces from
prompt-launch status, and reciprocal cuts in
tactical nuclear weapons. As of mid-2013, the
overall state of the political relationship
between the United States and Russia was so
cool, as a consequence of differences over
Syria and other non-nuclear issues, that no
early movement can be expected on any of
these fronts. But if a cooperative environment
can be re-established (not impossible even
over Syria, given common interests in calming
the region), and momentum generated around
these elements, over the next few years, the
56. See Herzenhorn D, Gordon M (2013) US Cancels Part
of Missile Defense That Russia Opposed. The New York
Times, 16 March 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/
17/world/europe/with-eye-on-north-korea-us-cancels-
missile-defense-russia-opposed.html?ref
=davidmherszenhorn
57. Browne D, Ischinger W, Ivanov I, Nunn S (2013)
Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region.
European Leadership Network (ELN), London, https://
www.nti.org/media/pdfs/BMS_Summary_Report_FINAL
.pdf
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2025 minimisation target described by the
ICNND is not out of reach.
As to the United States and China, there are
two general keys to ensuring that China does
not break out of its current ‘minimal deter-
rence’posture, and eventually joins in a serious
nuclear disarmament enterprise. The first is
success in advancing the United States–Russia
agenda described above, because without
major further reductions in the arsenals of the
big two it will be Quixotic to hope that China
will begin to reduce its own. The second,
perhaps more difficult for the United States to
embrace, but crucially necessary, is for Wash-
ington to accept, at least tacitly, what it has not
so far been prepared to, that its nuclear relation-
ship with China is one of ‘mutual vulnerabil-
ity’, meaning in practice that the United States
‘should plan and posture its force and base its
own policy on the assumption that an attempted
US disarming first strike, combined with US
missile defences, could not reliably deny a
Chinese nuclear retaliatory strike on the United
States’.58 It will be important in this respect for
the United States here, as with Russia, to defuse
concern about its growing missile defence and
long-range conventional strike capability, and
negotiation of United States–Russia limitations
on conventionally armed strategic weapons
systems should meet the latter Chinese anxiety.
As to the former, Arbatov and Dvorkin argue
plausibly that the current multi-layered BMD
system in the Pacific is adequate to counter
North Korean missile launches, and that any
further development of its sea and land-based
assets will be increasingly seen as having an
anti-Chinese purpose and should not be
pursued.59
As to China and India, just as China’s will-
ingness to cooperate on nuclear tension reduc-
tion measures is largely contingent in practice
on developments between the United States
and Russia, so too is India’s cooperation
largely dependent on developments in China.
For example, just as China has made clear that
it will not ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) unless and until the United
States does so, so has India made clear that it
will wait upon China.60 There is no obvious
way out of this cul-de-sac, other than for
India–China relations to improve to the point
that neither believes to be remotely credible a
major attack by the other—or at least that both
sides come to accept the arguments advanced
in this article, and agree that, in the words of
former Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh,
‘it would be rank, suicidal stupidity to even
think of any “nuclear” solution to the issues
that currently poison the air’.61 The rapidly
burgeoning trade relationship between the two
gives ground for confidence that this might be
achievable in the not too distant future but
outstanding territorial issues—over which the
two countries went to war 50 years ago—
would need to be addressed, and China’s
support for Pakistan civil nuclear programs
will continue to be a complicating issue.
As to India and Pakistan, Jaswant Singh’s
observation, just quoted, was intended also to
apply to this traditionally even more poisonous
relationship, but there is, unhappily, no present
sign of it having much traction in Islamabad,
still consumed as Pakistan is by belief in both
India’s malignant intent and its conventional
superiority. That said, a willingness by India to
ratify the CTBT, to accept a moratorium on the
further production of fissile material for
weapons use and to freeze its own nuclear
weapons production (perhaps conditional on
Pakistan doing likewise)—all of which could
and should have been demanded of it by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group as the quid pro
58. CSIS (2013) Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Rela-
tions: A Way Forward, p.18. Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington http://csis.org/files/
publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf:
the Group’s members were divided on whether the United
States should formally and publicly acknowledge ‘mutual
vulnerability’, largely on the ground that this might worry
regional allies, but united on the substance. This is also a
recommendation of Arbatov A and Dvorkin V (2013) The
Great Strategic Triangle. The Carnegie Papers http://
carnegie.ru/2013/04/01/great-strategic-triangle/fvbx
59. Arbatov and Dvorkin (2013), p.35.
60. See generally Dalton T, Tandler J (2012) Understand-
ing the Arms ‘Race’ in South Asia. The Carnegie Papers
September 2012, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Washington DC, http://carnegieendowment.org/
2012/09/13/understanding-arms-race-in-south-asia/dtj0
61. Communication with the author, 11 March 2013.
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quo for any supply of nuclear material or
technology—would do much to improve the
environment, and if Delhi’s relationship with
Beijing were to improve significantly, these
ambitious objectives might not be totally
unachievable.
If rationality is not to prevail in restraining
the present precarious nuclear relationship
between Pakistan and India, the burden will
have to fall on civility. There have been
occasions—most notably the February 1999
Lahore Summit between Prime Ministers
Sharif and Vajpayee—when this has indeed
prevailed, and has been accompanied by sig-
nificant confidence building and stabilising.
The aim must continue to be to pursue such
breakthroughs at the leadership level and hope
that they will not, as so often in the past, be
derailed by military adventurism or malign
third forces.62 There is no inherent reason, after
all, why this bilateral relationship should not
be capable of transformation. As George
Perkovich has pointed out, ‘India does not
harbour offensive intentions towards Pakistan.
India does not covet territory that Pakistan
controls. India does not wish for Pakistan to be
dismembered. Indian leaders recognise that it
is in their country’s interest for Pakistan to
develop economically, to democratise politi-
cally and to live in peace. India does not want
Pakistan’s problems to spill over into its terri-
tory or restive Muslim populations’.63
As to the situation with North Korea, it is not
obvious that its neighbours and the wider inter-
national community have any other options
than the familiar trio of containment, deter-
rence, and keeping the door open for negotia-
tions. As one involved, albeit at some distance,
in the negotiation and implementation of the
1994 Agreed Framework, the author is less
persuaded than some others that all the blame
for its breakdown belongs to Pyongyang, or that
it is impossible to contemplate another denu-
clearisation agreement ever being reached.
China continues to resist international pressure
to apply the leverage it undoubtedly has over
North Korea, through its capacity to cut off
food or energy supplies, on the grounds that this
would both risk implosion of the state, which no
one wants, and be counterproductive given the
siege mentality which seems to afflict the coun-
try’s leadership. It is not self-evident that this
response is simply self-serving.
As to the position of those US allies presently
sheltering—or believing they are sheltering—
under the umbrella of extended nuclear deter-
rence, undoubtedly what they could most
contribute to making nuclear disarmament
happen would be to make clear their acceptance
of a much reduced role for nuclear weapons in
their protection. So long as South Korea, Japan
and others in the region (and key European
allies) continue to insist that the nuclear option
be kept open for a variety of non-nuclear threat
contingencies, notwithstanding the United
States’ manifest capacity for the indefinitely
foreseeable future to deal with any of them
through the application of conventional mili-
tary force, they are contributing nothing to the
achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world.
No doubt it is easier for Australia than others
living in more troublesome neighbourhoods to
play a leadership role in this respect, but it
would add very considerable momentum to the
disarmament cause for Canberra to come out
strongly in favour of the United States adopting
not just a ‘sole purpose’ declaration, as it has
done, but a ‘No First Use’ posture.
***
Sometimes the biggest policy questions of all
get less attention than they deserve. So it is
with nuclear disarmament, an issue that in
earlier decades preoccupied decision-makers
and mobilised hundreds of thousands of
activists all over the world but which now, in
the post-Cold War era, barely resonates at all
with policy-makers or publics, and is any-
thing but a mainstream subject for scholars.
But when what is at stake in any use of
nuclear weapons is both a grotesque assault
on our common humanity and the potential
destruction of life on this planet as we know
it, this is hardly an issue which justifies either
62. Compare Dalton and Tandler (2012).
63. Perkovich G (2012) The Non-unitary Model and
Deterrence Stability in South Asia, p 19. Stimson Centre,
Washington DC, http://www.stimson.org/summaries/
perkovich-on-the-non-unitary-model-and-deterrence-
stability-in-south-asia/
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complacency or fatalism. And when the
central, critical premise of the argument for
retaining nuclear weapons is that disarma-
ment is undesirable—because nuclear deter-
rence works—this is not a claim which
should escape sustained critical scrutiny.
It is to be hoped that the scrutiny offered
here, focusing on Asia and the Pacific but
applicable globally, has at least raised serious
question marks about the viability of that tena-
cious belief, by policy-makers, and those who
influence them in nuclear-armed states and
their allies, that nuclear deterrence is of real
value to their national security, and that its
benefits outweigh any possible costs. The
trouble is, of course, that understanding does
not always readily translate into effective gov-
ernment action, and when the issues, and
national interests, involved are as many,
complex and interconnected as those described
here, it can be a very difficult and protracted
process to make even marginal gains.
There are two inescapable general conclu-
sions which emerge from this exploration. The
first is that, here as elsewhere, major policy
change will almost never happen without
visionary, creative and risk-taking political
leadership. Some of that necessary spark, from
the most influential state of all in this debate,
was ignited by President Barack Obama in
Prague in 2009 speech, and it is absolutely
crucial that it be reignited—as it was partially,
but only partially, by his 2013 Berlin speech—
during the remaining years of his term.
The second is the critical necessity, helped
by such leadership, for policy-makers world-
wide to escape from the time warp that still
enfolds so much of their security thinking.
Global public goods like peace and security
can only be delivered by collective, coopera-
tive action. National security is best achieved
with others, not against them. In the interde-
pendent world of the 21st century, depending
for our ultimate security on the prospect of
mutually assured destruction is neither an
intelligent nor comfortable place to be. It is
both a tragedy and a travesty, when reason and
experience teach us so much, that old habits of
mind about nuclear deterrence, in Asia and the
Pacific as elsewhere, continue to resonate as
they do and make nuclear disarmament as hard
as it is to achieve.
Final version accepted September 2013.
Evans: Nuclear Deterrence 111
© 2013 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
